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Case No.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
The State, in its brief, argues that the evidence at trial
establishes

each

of

the

elements

of

the

offense

of

depraved

indifference murder sufficiently to exclude reasonable doubt.

The

elements of depraved indifference murder under § 76-5-203(1) (c),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, are as follows:

(1)

that

the Defendant engaged in conduct which created a graved risk of
death to another and that conduct resulted in the death of another;
(2)

the Defendant knew that his conduct or the circumstances

surrounding his conduct created a grave risk of death to another;
(3)

the Defendant acted under circumstances evidencing a depraved

indifference to human life.

(Brief of Appellee, p.16-17)

State v.

Standiforfl, 769 p.2d 254 (Utah 1988); state v. Bolsinger, 698 p.2d
1214 (Utah 1985) .
As to the first element, the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to establish that the Defendant engaged in any
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another.

The

evidence was clear that the child suffered a skull fracture as well
as severed interspinous ligaments but that neither injury was the
actual cause of death. That was the testimony of Dr. Richard Boyer
at Tr. V. 3, at 1270, lines 7 through 14.
There was no evidence that this Defendant had ever engaged in
any conduct which would produce a skull fracture or the back
injury.

The only evidence involving the child's head was a slap on

top of the head which was insufficient to cause any injury.
V. 2, at 1037, 1044; V. 4, at 1414, 1416).

(Tr.

The only evidence

involving the back was the Defendant's practice of holding the
infant in the fetal position in a manner which was insufficient to
cause injury.

Indeed, no injuries from either practice were ever

reported and neither practice would be sufficient to cause injury
without a great deal of additional force or trauma.

(Tr. V. 3, at

1272-1273).
There was no evidence at all that any conduct engaged in by
this Defendant actually created a grave risk of death.
2

Again, the

evidence was that some additional force or different conduct would
be necessary to create any risk or injury at all, certainly to
create a grave risk of death.

(Tr. V. 3, at 1272-1273).

Neither

the State nor the jury is entitled to rely on the fact of death to
establish that any conduct by this Defendant created a grave risk
of death.

State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993); State V,

Tannerf 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).

The evidence must be substantial

and sufficient to establish that this Defendant's conduct actually
created a grave risk of death and actually caused the death of this
child.

The evidence in this case totally fails in that regard.

The second element requires proof that the Defendant knew that
his conduct or the surrounding circumstances created a grave risk
of death.

In other words, even if a grave risk of death was

actually created, the evidence must, in addition, establish that
this Defendant knew that such a risk was created by the conduct and
chose to engage in that conduct anyway.
There is no evidence of the Defendant's knowledge of the
existence of a grave risk of death because there is no evidence of
any conduct on his part which created the risk in the first place.
The State relied heavily on the practice of the Defendant of
holding the child in the fetal position in a manner which was
considered

improper

by

Rona

Harding.

The

evidence

was

uncontroverted, however, that such conduct would not, in and of
3

itself, create a grave risk of death without additional force or
without some different conduct, none of which was ever observed
relative to this Defendant.

Even Mrs. Hardingfs testimony was thsjt

she never observed this Defendant to engage in conduct which she
thought was for the purpose of hurting this child.
1105-1106, 1111-1112).

(Tr. V. 2, at

Indeed, the nature of the argument between

the Defendant and Rona Harding was that Mrs. Harding felt that
there was some chance of harm to the child and the Defendant felt
that his conduct posed no danger to the child at all.

Mrs.

Harding's testimony was that because of that difference of opinion
she and the Defendant argued frequently about various medical
issues.

(Tr. V. 2, at 1111, lines 2-15).

The State, in its brief, falls into the same evidentiary trap
as did the trial court in this case by drawing inference that the
Defendant knew that a grave risk of death was created from the fact
that the child, did in fact, die.

That analysis is reverse in its

nature in the sense that because there is a death, the conduct
causing that death must have created a grave risk of death and the
actor must have known as much.

For the evidence to be sufficient

as a matter of law that the risk was created and that the Defendant
knew of the risk, there must be evidence of what that conduct was
and what the circumstances were surrounding the conduct so that an
inference may be justified concluding that the risk was created and
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known by the Defendant,

State v. Workmanr 852 P.2d 981 (Utah

1993); State v. Tannerf 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).

There was no

evidence at this trial from which the jury could reasonably
conclude that this Defendant knew that his conduct created a grave
risk of death.
The third element of this offense requires proof that the
Defendant's conduct evidenced depraved indifference to human life.
While this analysis is similar to the element of knowledge of a
grave risk of death, it differs in that this element includes the
actus reus or the nature and extent of the conduct.

State v.

Standifordr 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988); State v. Bolsinger, 698 P.2d
1214 (Utah 1985).

Once again, the evidence at trial failed as a

matter of law to establish that this Defendant's conduct fit the
legal requirement of depraved indifference.
The State, in its brief at page 22, relies on the fact of
death and the nature of the injuries to infer the presence of
depraved indifference.

In other words the State engages in an

injury based analysis of depraved indifference.

The element of

depraved indifference, however, requires a conduct based analysis,
or in other words, requires evidence of the nature and extent of
the conduct, not necessarily the injuries.

There was no evidence

of what conduct by this Defendant could have caused this child's
injuries or her death, other than mere speculation that he could
5

have extended his prior conduct to include much greater force or
greatly increased pressure on this child without any evidence that
he did so.

The defense contends that such a leap crosses the

boundary from justifiable inferences to rampant speculation.
The

Defendant

presented

alternative

theories,

based

on

evidence, which were inconsistent with the guilt of the Defendant.
Unless the evidence is sufficient to exclude those alternate
theories and so to exclude reasonable doubt, the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to uphold a verdict of guilty.
State Vt
Worthenf

GallegPS, 851 P.2d

1185

765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988).

(Utah App. 1993); State Vt
The evidence that Christy

Barney had equal access to the child, even more access to the child
inasmuch as she was alone with the child for three hours after the
Defendant left for work at 5:30 a.m. on the morning the child was
hospitalized, and that Ms. Barney was more likely to have injured
the child and caused her death, create reasonable doubt as a matter
of law.

Even the testimony of Ms. Barney was that if anyone hurt

this child, it was her, not this Defendant.

(Tr. V. 6, at 1807;

Tr. V. 5, at 1647-1648; V. 5, at 1650; Tr. V. 5, at 1656-1660; V.
4,

at 1497; Tr. V. 2, at 1020).

This verdict is based on

speculation and conjecture and is, indeed, "so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained

$

a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty."

State v. Gallegosr

851 P.2d 1185# 1190 (Utah App. 1993).
II
THE ISSUE OF TEE ADEQUACY OF THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
INSTRUCTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
The State argues in its brief that the Defendant waived any
objection to the instruction given by the Court defining depraved
indifference as an element of the offense of depraved indifference
homicide.

(State's brief at p. 24)

The basis for this assertion

is that in a written objection to the requested instruction counsel
for the Defendant stated that the requested instruction was a
"correct statement of the law, but the Defendant has submitted a
modified requested instruction D4a which is a correct statement of
the law and more accurately and adequately defines the term
•depraved indifference1 according to current rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court."

(Tr. at 423)

All of this language was in the

context of a written objection to the instructions D4 and D4a
requested by the State.

When the trial judge presented the

instruction in the form as he intended to give it in the charge to
the jury, no opportunity was afforded to the Defendant to argue the
objection.

Defendant's trial counsel indicated that the Defendant

still objected to the instruction but no opportunity was afforded
to restate the objection nor to argue it.
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Against this factual background, the Statefs argument that no
objection was stated to the trial court nor preserved for appeal as
to Instruction No. 4 is without merit.

Indeed, a statement that a

requested instruction is a "correct statement of the law" but still
inadequate, inaccurate or incomplete and that the Defendant has
submitted

an

alternate

request

which

"more

accurately

and

adequately" meets the legal requirements for sufficiency can hardly
be said to waive any objection on the instruction.

The Defendant

has now, quite candidly, submitted on this appeal that neither the
request by the State nor the request by the Defendant nor the
instruction as given by the Court rise to the level of sufficiency
in accordance with the prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court.
That assertion, however, does not imply waiver or invitation to
error.
Even if this Court finds that the Defendant's statement of
objection to the trial court lacks sufficiency by failing to state
"distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection", (State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1991))
Instruction No. 4 as given by the trial court constitutes "plain
error" and "exceptional circumstances" resulting

in "manifest

injustice" so to required this Court to review the matter on
appeal.

8

Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that this
Court may take into consideration "plain error11 that affects the
••substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not
brought tc the attention of the Court.

State v. Brownr No. 900148

(Utah 1992); State v. Eldredgef 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).

The

standard in finding plain error requires that first, the error be
plain, i.e. the record must indicate that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error.

Second,

the error must affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e.
that the error is harmful.

State v. Eldredgef 773 P.2d 29, 36

(Utah 1989).
The nature of the elements of depraved indifference homicide
make it clear and obvious that a clear and correct definition of
the terms used in those elements is essential to a jury which is
expected to understand exactly what conduct meets the definition of
those elements.

Instruction No. 4 completely fails in that regard

as pointed out in the initial Brief of Appellant in this case.

It

is the trial judge's duty to properly instruct the jury and to
correct errors in instructions requested by counsel before giving
the charge to the jury.
Indeed,

State v. Jonesf No. 890297 (Utah 1991).

Instruction No. 4 is much more than

instruction to the jury as to their duty.

a general

Instruction No. 4, while

it is not the actual elements instruction setting out the various
9

elements of the offense, it is a part and parcel of the elements
instruction because it gives the definitions of terminology used in
the elements instruction.

Because Instruction No. 4 fails to

properly or adequately define the terminology of the elements of
depraved indifference homicide, this jury was left to speculate as
to the meaning of those elements.

In this case, the jury was left

to wonder what the difference was between depraved indifference and
reckless conduct.

The Defense contends that it was precisely this

failure in the instructions which allowed this jury to reach its
verdict of guilty on the questionable evidence in this case.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it is plain
error for a trial court to fail to give "an accurate instruction
upon the basic elements of an offense". State v. Jonesr No. 890297
(Utah 1991).

Failure to do so constitutes reversible error, which

error can never be harmless.

id.

The instruction must instruct

the jury with respect to all the legal elements that it must find
to convict of the crime charged.

id.

The contention of the Defense is that a complete failure to
properly instruct as to the definitions of the words or the phrases
used

in the elements instruction is tantamount to a complete

failure to instruct on the elements in the first instance.

That is

especially true in a case such as this where the legal theory of
depraved indifference is obscure even to the trained legal mind.
10

State

V.

Standi ford,

difference,

if

such

769

P.2d

exists,

254,

263

between

(Utah
a

1988).

"substantial

The
and

unjustifiable risk" of death (manslaughter) and a "grave risk of
death" (depraved murder) has been said to be not meaningful.

Id.

A lack of definition of these legal terms leaves the jury without
necessary guidance to determine whether the facts in the case
presented meet the necessary definitions or elements of the offense
charged.
Finally, this is not a case where trial counsel merely
remained silent on the offending instruction (State v. Medina, 738
P. 2d 1021

(Utah 1987)) or where the Defendant

requested the

instruction of the trial Court (State v. Perduer 813 P. 2d 1201
(Utah 1991)).

Defendant's trial counsel objected in writing to the

requested instruction on the grounds that it failed to adequately
define the elements terminology and that "Defendant has submitted
a modified requested instruction D4a which is a correct statement
of the law and more accurately and adequately defines the term
'depraved indifference1 according to current rulings of the Utah
Supreme Court."

(Tr. at 423) While the objection as stated to the

trial Court may have not included all of the arguments advanced on
appeal,

the

objection

and

the

grounds

stated

therefor

were

certainly adequate to notify the trial judge that the Defendant
contended that the instruction as given was improper and that other
11

instructions were necessary to so instruct the jury and why.

This

issue is properly before this Court on appeal.
Ill
THE ISSUE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH DEPRAVED MURDER
STATUTE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
The

State

argues that the

Defendants

constitutionality

argument pertaining to Section 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended is improper on appeal inasmuch as it was not raised
below.

The Defense, however, contends that the statute is

unconstitutional on its face and that its application to this
Defendant was plain error and that specieil circumstances are
present which mandate consideration of this issue on appeal to
prevent manifest injustice.
The plain error exception is governed by State v. Eldredge,
supra.

The analysis which pertains to finding plain error is

discussed fully in Point II above and the same analysis applies in
the case of the constitutional issue.

The Defendant contends that

plain error exists because the statute is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to this Defendant and the Court of Appeals
should so find.
"Exceptional circumstances" is a term which "is broad and
remains somewhat undefined".
(Utah 1991).

State v. Archambeauf 820 P.2d 920

One factor to be considered in determining whether

exceptional circumstances exist is whether the Defendant's liberty
12

is at stake.

State v. Archambeau. supra.; State V» Breckenriflge,

688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983); State V, Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah
1990).

In this case, it certainly is. Other factors have not been

clearly defined for exceptional circumstances.

The Defendant

contends that exceptional circumstances exist in this case in that
the statute in question is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty in

delineating how the elements of depraved murder differ from
manslaughter.

The time has come to declare the legal fiction of

depraved indifference unconstitutional and this case presents the
best example why that is the correct result.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Defendant-Appellant submits that this Court
should find that the evidence below was insufficient to support the
verdict

of

guilty

and

this

case

instructions to enter a dismissal.
should

find

that

the

Utah

should

be

remanded

with

In the alternative, this Court
Depraved

unconstitutional and reverse this judgment.

Murder

statute

is

In the alternative,

this Court should find that the Defendant was deprived of a fair
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trial on the remaining grounds on appeal and should remand for a
new trial.
Submitted this U r —

day of February, 1995.

JMSES G. CLARK
.Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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